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Abstract—We study operational security in computer 
network security, including infrastructure, internal processes, 
resources, information, and physical environment. Current 
works on developing a security framework focus on a security 
ontology that contributes to applying common vocabulary, but 
such an approach does not assist in constructing a foundation for 
a holistic security methodology. We focus on defining the bounds 
and creating a representation of a security system by developing 
a diagrammatic representation (i.e. a model) as a means to 
describe computer network processes. The model, referred to a 
thinging machine, is a first step toward developing a security 
strategy and plan. The general aim is to demonstrate that the 
representation of the security system plays a key role in making 
thinking visible through conceptual description of the 
operational environment, a region in which active security 
operations are undertaken. We apply the proposed model for 
email security by conceptually describing a real email system. 
Keywords—Network security; conceptual model; diagrammatic 
representation; email system 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security typically refers to the state of being secure; that is, 
being free from danger (the reciprocal of safety). A security 
system involves deterrence and prevention of threats and is 
internally motivated as a self-protecting system. It is possible 
to be in a safe state while danger is present. We can represent 
this with the notion of threat as a point on a scale between 
safety and harm that indicates potential danger. Threat also 
indicates the degree of preparedness required to achieve 
security. 
Preparedness contrasts with vulnerability. Given a certain 
degree of threat, security is a measure of preparedness for 
confronting such a threat. The first requirement of 
preparedness is defining the bounds and creating a 
representation of the operational environment. The first phase 
in operational security involves identifying critical assets (e.g., 
data) and an infrastructure in the operational environment [1]. 
From the military’s perspective [2], the first step in 
characterizing the operational environment involves identifying 
the operational area and determining the significant 
characteristics and level of detail. 
According to Tolone et al. [2], “The success of defense and 
security operations depends on the ability to make sense of the 
operational environment and to anticipate those factors that 
influence operations both negatively and positively.” Making 
sense refers to creating situational awareness and employing 
continuous effort to understand connections, anticipate their 
trajectories, and act effectively [2]. 
In this context, this paper imports the sense of operational 
security in computer network security, including infrastructure, 
internal processes, resources, information, and physical 
environment. We focus on defining the bounds and creating a 
representation by developing a diagrammatic representation 
(i.e. model) as a means to describe computer network facilities. 
It is a first step toward developing a security strategy and plan. 
A. The Security Problem 
Researchers have categorized some security problems as 
“wicked problems” due to their complexity, intricacy, and 
intractability [3]. According to Gilmore [4], “Many cyber 
issues personify a wicked problem. Cyber security can never 
truly be solved (a completely secure network is a myth).” 
Huguet [5] examined the security notion in general, 
concluding, “Nowadays there are several ‘securities’ and a 
number of models from different fields. Despite the importance 
of the issue, surprisingly, there is no common vocabulary, 
procedures, definition or model to share knowledge about 
security.” Having a general framework of the security concept, 
in which to integrate those models and concepts, has 
advantages, such as shared vocabulary, knowledge, 
development, or metrics [6-7]. Solms and Solms [7] 
emphasized that “with the need to implement IT-security 
measures in almost every environment. Holistic security 
ontology is still missing. We have to model proper 
countermeasures capable of protecting the resources.” The 
authors also stressed infrastructure elements such as electronic 
devices and networks, as well as their relationships. 
We note that current works on developing a security 
framework focus on a security ontology that contributes to 
applying a common vocabulary, but such an approach does not 
assist in constructing a foundation for a holistic security 
methodology: “a holistic formal graphical and textual paradigm 
for the representation, development, and lifecycle support of 
complex systems” [8]. Moreover, in security, “the problem lies 
in the details” [9]. Maintaining security networks with 
heterogeneous systems, policies, and capabilities quickly 
became a major task because system administrators were 
required to maintain detailed descriptions of each host [9]. 
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B. Contributing to the Solution 
This paper focuses on developing a modeling language that 
can be utilized to build a security foundation. The objective is 
to demonstrate that the representation of the security system 
plays a key role in making thinking visible, through conceptual 
description of the security of the operational environment, a 
region in which active security operations are undertaken. 
Fig. 1 and 2 show two descriptions of such a theater of 
operations. 
Our proposed representation (model) is constructed in 
terms of a diagram that serves at the level between “natural 
communication” and semiformal specification to facilitate 
understanding among all security participants as a first step 
toward developing and implementing security policies and 
implementation plans. 
C. Focus 
Without loss of generality, in this paper we focus on 
developing a foundation for email security through 
conceptually describing what we previously called a theater of 
operation involving email. Today, email has become the 
backbone of many professionals’ daily activity. Emails are 
most frequently used in commerce [12]. In everyday life, we 
rely on email’s confidentiality and integrity to exchange data 
and communication. 
According to Landewe [13], email is the primary threat to 
companies using enterprise platforms, such as Office 365. 
Email security aims to develop an email technology with a 
more innovative and multilayered approach to cloud security. 
New email security technology involves monitoring user 
behavior and events, as well as greater access to files, users, 
and controls. This allows suspicious email to be caught before 
it reaches an inbox. Using API, it is instead held in a quarantine 
folder. A copy of the email is run through various technologies 
(e.g., sandboxing) [13]. The identification of suspicious email 
is accomplished by performing language and contextual 
analysis and business email compromise and phishing analysis. 
Emails with a URL must be handled with link analysis using 
real-time feeds or by sandboxing the URL [13]. 
 
Fig. 1. Mail Theater of Operation (adapted from [10]). 
 
Fig. 2. Sample Description of a Theater of Operation (adapted from [11]). 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The email system architecture is typically introduced when 
discussing email issues. Two samples of such representations 
are shown in Fig. 3 and 4. Many types of email network 
diagrams exist, and UML diagrams are also used (e.g., use-case 
diagram). Fig. 5 shows a sample of email models. Other works 
use architectural diagrams that supplement a hardware-oriented 
network to investigate logical data flow embedded in a system. 
This approach arrives at a variation of the UML diagrams and 
includes actual hardware connectivity and logical flow of data 
(e.g. [14]). In UML, the multiplicity of diagrams is a known 
problem [8] when what is needed is a single, integrated 
diagrammatic representation that incorporates function, 
structure, and behavior. 
 
Fig. 3. Email System Architecture (Partially Adapted from [15]). 
 
Fig. 4. Email System Architecture (Partially Adapted from [16]). 
 
Fig. 5. Sample UML Email System Model (Partially Adapted from [17]). 
III. THINGING MACHINE 
According to Wong [18], tackling wicked problems can be 
achieved by conceptualizing them as systems and breaking 
them down into “chunks of information” or digestible nodes 
and their relationships. In describing the model for email 
operational security, we use the thinging machine (TM) model 
[19-28] where all operational elements are conceptualized in 
terms of a single ontological entity, the thimac (thing/machine). 
As we show, thimacs can represent heterogeneous entities: 
physical entities (e.g., a server, router, or workstation), 
software objects (e.g., a program or software system), and 
other notions (e.g., protocols, flows, or plans). 
The term thing (in contrast to objects in object-oriented 
modeling) indicates an expansive specification of an entity that 
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reflects one mode of an entity’s being. Heidegger’s [29] notion 
was that a thing is not a mere abstract object but something that 
is operated on (created, changed, and transported) and, 
simultaneously, a process (machine) that subjects other things 
to its activities (creating, changing, and transporting). 
According to Heidegger [29], a thing “things”; that is, it 
gathers, unites, or ties together its constituents, in the same way 
that a bridge unifies aspects of its environment (e.g., a stream, 
its banks, and the surrounding landscape) [30]. 
Building on such a philosophical approach, things are 
combined with process by viewing them as blocks of single 
ontological thimacs, which populate a world that is also a 
thimac (we call it a system). In contrast to the object-oriented 
paradigm, every part of this world is a thimac, forming a 
thimac-ing network. A unit of such a universe has dual being 
as a thing and as a machine. A thing is created, processed, 
released, transferred, and/or received. A machine creates, 
processes, releases, transfers, and/or receives things. We will 
alternate between the terms thimac, thing, and machine 
according to the context. 
The thimac as a {thing, machine} pair designates what 
simultaneously divides and brings together a thing and a 
machine (process in the general sense). Every thimac appears 
in a system either by creation or importation from outside the 
system. They are the concomitants (required components) of a 
system and form the current fixity of being for any system that 
continuously changes from one form (thing/machine) to 
another. We will use the notion of thimac to model an email 
system focusing on security aspects. 
The terms system and model have been used ubiquitously 
in engineering [31]. In TM, a system is the overall constellation 
of thimacs that structures all subthimacs in the problem under 
consideration. It provides the problem’s unifying element 
through space and time as integral subthimacs, not as the sum 
of individual subthimacs. Thimacs inside a system are 
understood not as things with properties but as ensembles of 
things and machines that constantly interact with each other 
and with the out-of-system world. 
In this complex model, events (a type of thimac that 
involves time) appear, propagate, and constantly recur in 
various parts of the system with repeatable occurrences and 
stable regularities. In its static and dynamic modes, the whole 
system is a representation (mimesis) of a portion of reality. 
Accordingly, a thimac’s existence depends on its position 
in the larger system, as either a thing that flows in other 
machines or a machine that handles a flow of things (i.e., 
create, process, release, transfer, and receive things). It brings 
together and embraces both “thingishness” and “machineness.” 
A thing’s flow is conceptualized as an abstract structure that 
forms an abstract machine called a TM (Fig. 6), in which the 
elementary processes are called the stages of a TM. In the TM 
model, we claim that five generic processes of things exist: 
things can be created, processed, released, transferred, and 
received. These five processes form the foundation for 
modeling thimacs. Among the five stages, flow (solid arrow in 
Fig. 6) signifies conceptual movement from one machine to 
another or among the stages of a machine. The TM stages can 
be described as follows. 
 
Fig. 6. A Thinging Machine. 
Arrival: A thing reaches a new machine. 
Acceptance: A thing is permitted to enter the machine. If 
arriving things are always accepted, then arrival and 
acceptance can be combined into the receive stage. 
Processing (change): A thing undergoes some kind of 
transformation, without creating a new thing. 
Release: A thing is marked as ready to be transferred 
outside of the machine. 
Transference: A thing is transported somewhere outside of 
the machine. 
Creation: A new thing is born (created) in a machine. 
“Create” resembles “there is.” 
In addition, the TM model includes memory and triggering 
(represented as dashed arrows) relations among the processes’ 
stages (machines). 
IV. EXAMPLE OF A THINGING MACHINE 
To illustrate TM modeling, in this section we model a 
communication protocol in widespread use today. One 
definition of a protocol is a standard description used to define 
a method of exchanging data over a computer network [32]. In 
TM, a protocol is viewed as a thimac (machine) that is formed 
from subthimacs that create, process, release, transfer, and/or 
receive things (e.g., signals, data, or messages). The protocol is 
also a thing that can be created and processed (e.g., updated). 
We apply TM modeling to the well-known simple mail transfer 
protocol (SMTP). 
SMTP is an Internet standard for email transmission [33-
34]. It allows for a simple email service and is responsible for 
moving messages from one email server to another. SMTP 
includes many standard commands (e.g., EHLO, MAIL 
FROM, RCPT TO, DATA, and QUIT). 
The SMTP protocol and how email works can be explained 
by tracking the journey of an email message from one person, 
say, Bob, to another, Alice. Bob composes his message and 
after inserting Alice’s email address, he clicks the “send” 
button. SMTP governs the communication between Bob’s 
mail server and Alice’s mail server [35]. Fig. 7 shows a 
sequence diagram that models all the events (in the UML 
sense) involved in this communication, assuming 
everything works correctly. This diagram is shown in many 
sources on the Internet (e.g., [35][36][37]). 
Fig. 8 shows the corresponding TM model, in which the 
whole protocol is constructed from the two subthimacs: Bob’s 
mail server and Alice’s mail server. In the first machine, the 
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EHLO message (identifying domain, e.g., Gmail.com) is 
constructed and sent by Bob’s mail server (Circle 1 in Fig. 8). 
The message flows to Alice’s mail server, where it is 
processed (2) to create a response message (3) of 
acknowledgement (4), along with the name of the email 
services that the SMTP server can support (e.g., Yahoo.com). 
Bob’s mail server sends the sender’s email address (5; e.g., 
Bob@gmail.com), which flows to Alice’s mail server to 
trigger an OK message (6) that reaches Bob’s mail server. 
Afterwards, Bob’s mail server sends the email address of the 
recipient (e.g., Alice@yahoo.com) (7) to trigger Alice’s mail 
server to reply with an OK message (8). 
At this point, Bob’s mail server requests that the data part 
of the email be sent (9), and upon receiving a ready message 
from Alice’s mail server (10), Bob’s mail server starts sending 
the data (11) line by line. Upon sending the whole message, 
Alice’s mail server sends an acceptance of the message (12). 
Upon receiving the message, Bob’s mail server requests to quit 
(13) and Alice’s mail server sends a signal to close the 
connection (15), which is closed as the last step (15). 
In contrast to the sequence diagram in Fig. 7, the 
representation in Fig. 8 is based on TM. Although the sequence 
diagram potentially includes millions of arbitrary actions (e.g., 
send, identify, terminate, receive, respond, accept, and close), 
the TM specification repeatedly uses five generic operations. 
Even though Fig. 8 has the appearance of a complex structure, 
this complexity is a visual impression that emerges from this 
repeated application of TM. According to Bishop [38], systems 
that have a complicated set of interacting parts may actually 
exhibit relatively simple behavior. 
Fig. 8 models the static description of SMTP. To model the 
dynamic behavior, we use events. An event in TM is a thimac 
that includes a time machine. For example, Fig. 9 shows the 
event Sending a line of data. Because a hierarch of events 
exists in the SMTP example, we select the 12 events in Fig. 10. 
Accordingly, Fig. 11 shows the dynamic behavior of the SMTP 
system. 
 
Fig. 7. Representation of SMTP as a Sequence Diagram. 
 
Fig. 8. The SMTP Thinging Machine. 
 
Fig. 9. The Event Sending a Line of Data. 
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Fig. 10. Events of the SMTP Thinging Machine. 
 
Fig. 11. The Chronology of Events in the SMTP Thinging Machine. 
V. CASE STUDY 
The map of the email system’s security control is essential 
for understanding, implementation, expansion of the design, 
training, documentation, and management. The map includes 
descriptions of each email security device and system that 
participates in the network. In this case study, we develop such 
a map for a currently existing government network (workplace 
of the second author). We limit our mapping to tracking the 
email throughout the network. This involves diagramming the 
creation and processing stages of the email’s flow from the 
user workstation to its destination. This includes the following 
components. 
1) User’s workstation (e.g., any smart device that can 
access the organization’s email system). 
2) Email system: The email system that includes servers 
that facilitate emailing across the network. 
3) Internal firewall: An internal firewall only allows 
legitimate traffic based on configured policy and rules. 
4) Email security gateway: An email security gateway 
prevents the transmission of emails that violate policy, 
malware, or transfer of information with malicious intent. 
5) External firewall: An external firewall only connects an 
internal network to an external network and all services or 
published servers, along with third-party connection (in our 
case Internet), to separate and secure internal networks and 
traffic. 
6) Domain Name System (DNS) server: A DNS server is a 
computer server that contains a database of public IP addresses 
and their associated host names, and in most cases, serves to 
resolve or translate those names to IP addresses as requested 
(e.g., www.google.com will be translate to 8.8.8.8). DNS 
servers run special software and communicate with each other 
using special protocols. 
7) Internet service provider router: A router provides 
access to the Internet and transfers the traffic from the external 
firewall to the Internet cloud. 
Fig. 12 shows a general picture of the connections among 
these components of our case study. 
 
Fig. 12. A General View of the Modelled Network. 
VI. TM EMAIL MODEL 
Fig. 13 shows the TM model of the system. 
A. In the user Workstation 
In the figure, the email process starts when the user, on his 
or her workstation (1), creates an email (2) using the email 
system (3). This process involves the following. 
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Fig. 13. The TM Model of the Email System. 
1) The destination address is either typed in using the 
keyboard (4) or retrieved from storage (5) to be processed (6) 
in the email system to create an initial destination format (7). 
2) In addition, the header format (8) is retrieved and flows 
to the email (9). 
3) The email body is created (10) and flows to the 
email (11). 
4) If there is attachment (12), then it flows to the 
email (13). 
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5) The header is created (14) by combining the destination 
(15) and initial header information (16) to fill the IP address 
fields. 
6) The email packet is generated (19) by conjoining the 
header IP address field information (17, 18), body (20), and 
attachments (21). 
B. In the Email Server 
The email packet leaves the user’s workstation (22) and 
reaches the email server (known as the exchange server). The 
packet is processed in the email server to extract the header 
(23), and then the destination is extracted (24) for comparison 
with the information in the current domain. 
1) If the destination has the same current information 
domain (26), then the packet flows (27) to be processed (28) 
for comparison with preconfigured mailboxes (29). 
- If a destination mail box is found (30), then the packet 
flows (31) to the user’s work station (32). 
- If the destination mail box is not found (33), then the 
packet is dropped. 
2) If the destination does not have the same current 
information domain (34), then the packet flows (35) to the 
internal firewall (36). 
C. In the Internal Firewall 
In the internal firewall, the packet is checked (37) for an 
email server ID (38): 
1) If its source is not from the current email server (39), 
then it is dropped (40). 
2) If its source is from the current email server, then the 
header is extracted (41) and the destination in the header is 
extracted (42). Then the destination flows (43) to be processed 
(44). 
-If the destination is not permitted (45) by the security 
rules and polices (46), then the packet is dropped (47, 
48). 
-If the destination is permitted (49) by the security rules 
and polices (46), then the packet flows to the email 
security gateway system (50, 51, and 52). 
D. In the Email Security Gateway System 
In the email security gateway system, the packet is 
compared (53) with the security rules and polices (54). 
1) (i) If the packet does not satisfy all polices and rules, 
then it is dropped (55). 
2) (ii) If the packet is passes all polices and rules (56) then 
it’s flow to the External Firewall (56). 
E. In the External Firewall 
The packet is processed (57) in the external firewall. 
1) If the packet does not satisfy the security rules and 
polices (58), then it is dropped (59). 
2) If the packet satisfies all polices and rules (60), then the 
header information (61) and the destination (62) are extracted 
from the header. The destination flows to the DNS server (63) 
to be compared with the stored DNS database records (64) to 
select the related destination MX record (65). The MX record, 
known as the mail exchanger record, specifies the mail server 
responsible for accepting email messages on behalf of a 
domain name. It is a resource recorded in the DNS. This record 
flows to be processed again (66 and 67) with the DNS polices 
to create the destination IP address (68) that flows to the header 
(69 and 70). 
The IP address of the header flows to be processed (71) 
with the public IP address (72) to be processed again to create 
the natted public IP address that is used for the routing polices 
(73), which flows again to the header (74 and 75). 
Once the header is updated, the packet is released (76) to be 
processed (77) with the IP address routing polices (78) to learn 
its next destination, then it travels (79) to the Internet service 
provider router. 
F. In the Internet Service Provider Router 
The email packet leaves the external firewall and is 
transferred (80) to the cloud (81). 
VII. TM DYNAMIC MODEL 
Note that the static email model structure is formed from 
the flows among thimacs in the system. It also includes the 
network of thimacs belonging to the system. The resultant 
conceptual model is a representation of structure in the email 
system. An email has a class (e.g., object-oriented) form with 
header, data, and attachment attributes (object-oriented 
terminology). These are filled by flows to produce an object 
(object-oriented terminology). The behavior is yet to be 
defined when we incorporate events in the static model. Note 
the two forms of a thimac. For example, the packet is a 
machine that is fed addresses, pieces of data, and attachments. 
As soon as it is loaded, it flows as a thing to the email server. 
A thimac is activated by elevating it to a time thimac (e.g., 
a subdiagram of Fig. 13 becomes the region of an event). We 
can develop the dynamic model of the email system as we did 
before, for the SMTP protocol. However, in consideration of 
space, we only identify events in the user workstation and the 
pre-email server as shown in Fig. 14. Thus, what appeared in 
Fig. 13 as the transmission of one packet, in the dynamic 
model with its chronology of events (Fig. 15), we see as a 
repeated generation of packets until all data and attachments 
have been sent. 
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Fig. 14. Selected Events in the user Workstation. 
 
Fig. 15. Chronology of Events in the user Workstation. 
VIII. TM SECURITY MODELING 
In the TM network model, we can separate separate the 
network security system from the functional system. Each 
security thimac (hardware and software) can be described by 
tracking the packet flow. The ad hoc diagrams and flowcharts 
currently in use (e.g. see Fig. 16 and 17) are “crude” 
representations that are not as systematic as the TM model, 
which involves only five primitive operations. In addition, 
these current representations do not model dynamic aspects in 
the same diagram, e.g., events of firewall-1 as shown in 
Fig. 18. 
 
Fig. 16. Packet flow Check Point Firewall (Partially Adapted from [39]). 
 
Fig. 17. Packet Processing in Firewall (Partially Adapted from [40]). 
 
Fig. 18. Events in Firewall-1 (see Fig. 13). 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we claim that the task of building a security 
system requires construction of a diagrammatic representation 
of the operational environment where protected assets reside. 
We criticized current modeling languages (e.g., UML and ad 
hoc diagrams) as languages that either include large 
heterogeneous notions or nonsystematic symbols (wall, cloud, 
screen, human figure, etc.). Instead, we have proposed using 
TM modeling and applied TM language to an actual email 
system by tracking security aspects as an email flows through 
various system components. The resultant map can be used as a 
foundation for the activities of an email security officer, just as 
a network diagram is a tool for a network engineer. Future 
work will apply the TM model to different types of networks. 
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